State Regulation of Casino Gambling:  Constitutional Limitations and Federal Labor Law Preemption by Keneally, Kathryn
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 49 Issue 6 Article 5 
1981 
State Regulation of Casino Gambling: Constitutional Limitations 
and Federal Labor Law Preemption 
Kathryn Keneally 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathryn Keneally, State Regulation of Casino Gambling: Constitutional Limitations and Federal Labor Law 
Preemption, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 1038 (1981). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol49/iss6/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE REGULATION OF CASINO GAMBLING:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND FEDERAL
LABOR LAW PREEMPTION
INTRODUCTION
Gambling, although not illegal at common law,' is generally consid-
ered a threat to the moral 2 and economic 3 order of society. Conse-
quently, gambling is frequently prohibited.4 The direct revenues'
and the indirect economic benefits 6 that result from legalized casino
gambling, however, have caused some states to take a different view.
1. In re Pierotti, 43 Nev. 243, 246, 184 P. 209, 209 (1919); Carll & Ramagosa,
Inc. v. Ash, 23 N.J. 436, 438, 129 A.2d 433, 434 (1957); National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776-1976, at 3
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Development of the Law of Gambling].
2. Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling, Gam-
bling in America 1, 68 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gambling in America].
3. Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 1-2; Development of the Law of
Gambling, supra note I, at 795.
4. Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 9-13, 252 P.2d 835, 836-37 (1953); State
ex rel. Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nev. 364, 372-74, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (1931);
Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 11, 35-38; Development of the Law of Gam-
bling, supra note 1, at 557-610.
5. Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 81-82; Development of the Law of
Gambling, supra note 1, at 459, 461-63; Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casi-
no Gambling, 8 Fordham Urb. L.J. 245, 246-47 (1980). Nevada imposes numerous
taxes and fees on its casino gambling industry. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.370-.406
(1979). Approximately one-third of Nevada's total state income is derived from gam-
bling revenues. Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 81. These revenues appear to
be a consistent, secure source of state revenue. Id. at 80; Development of the Law of
Gambling, supra note 1. at 462. Because of these revenues, Nevada does not impose
any state income tax. Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 80.
6. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 648 (9th Cir. 1962) (Pope, J., concurring);
Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 80-82; Development of the Law of Gambling,
supra note 1, at 459-61; Rose, supra note 5, at 247-48. The most significant indirect
economic benefits that flow from legalized casino gambling are jobs both in the casi-
nos and in related industries such as hotels, restaurants, and bars. Marshall v.
Sawyer, 301 F.2d at 648 (Pope, J., concurring); Gambling in America, supra note 2,
at 81. Approximately half of Nevada's adult population is employed in businesses
directly or indirectly related to casino gambling. Development of the Law of Gam-
bling, supra note 1, at 460. As a result of legalized casino gambling, recession and
unemployment have had only a minimal impact on Nevada's economy. Gambling in
America, supra note 2, at 80. New Jersey's express purpose in legalizing casino
gambling was to foster urban redevelopment in Atlantic City and to obtain the result-
ant revenues. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-1(b)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1980-1981); see Note,
The Casino Act: Gambling's Past and the Casino Act's Future, 10 Rut.-Cam. L.J.
279, 279-80 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Casino Act].
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Both Nevada and New Jersey have already legalized casino
gambling,7 and it is currently under consideration in New York."
Revenues, however, are not the only by-products of legalized casi-
no gambling. Historically, it has been plagued with corruption and
infiltration by organized crime.' To insure that states realize the full
economic benefits of this activity,' 0 and to maintain public safety,"
legalized casino gambling exists only under comprehensive state
regulation.'2
7. Nevada Gaming Control Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.010-.720 (1979); Casino
Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
8. N.Y.A. Nos. 1455, 1456, 1457, 1458, 1459, 1460, 204th Scss. (Mar. 19. 1981).
9. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 648 (9th Cir. 1962) (Pope, J., concurring);
Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 119-20, 310 P.2d 852, 854 (1957);
Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 79-80; Development of the Law of Gambling,
supra note 1, at 437-42; E. Reid & 0. Demaris, The Green Felt Jungle 14-97 (1963);
J. Skolnick, House of Cards 239-330 (1978).
10. Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.) C' 'Neada's principal
industry, we say is tourism .... Now it would be less than candid to say a great
many people do not come into our State because we have some forms of legal gamb-
ling .... It is a way of life.' " (quoting Gov. Sawyer of Nevada)), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 648 (9th Cir. 1962) (Pope, J.,
concurring) ("I take judicial notice that Nevada simply cannot afford to lose its gam-
bling business .... ); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.130(1)(a) (1979) C"The gaming industry
is vitally important to the economy of the state and the general welfare of the inhabi-
tants."); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-1(b)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1980-1981) (purpose of legaliz-
ing casino gambling is to obtain resultant economic benefits).
11. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 649 (1962) (Pope, J., concurring); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 463.130(1)(d) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-1(b)(7)-(17) (West Supp.
1980-1981).
12. Nevada Gaming Control Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.010-.720 (1979); Casino
Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp. 1980-1981). Current
enforcement of Nevada's gambling statutes is delegated to three regulator)' agencies.
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.021-.120 (1979). The Gaming Policy Commission, headed by
the Governor and composed of representatives of the other two agencies, the casino
industry, and the public, serves an advisory function regarding state casino gambling
policy. Id. § 463.021. The Nevada Gaming Commission has the authority to make all
licensing decisions, to enact regulations consistent with the Gaming Control Act, and
to initiate judicial proceedings. Id. §§ 463.140(2), .141-. 142, .145-.1594. The State
Gaming Control Board functions as the investigatory and enforcement arm of the
Nevada Gaming Commission. Id. § 463.140. It conducts background investigations
and makes licensing recommendations, enforces gambling statutes and regulations,
collects taxes and fees, and polices licensed gambling establishments. Id. See gener-
ally Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 83-86; J. Skolnick, supra note 9, at
147-49; Rose, supra note 5, at 268-78. New Jersey has established two agencies to
regulate casino gambling. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-50, -55 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
The Casino Control Commission conducts hearings and issues licenses, collects fees
and taxes, promulgates regulations consistent with the Casino Control Act, and hears
civil cases arising under the Act or its own regulations. Id. § 5:12-63. The Division of
Gaming Enforcement conducts investigations of license applications, assists the Com-
mission in its investigation and enforcement duties, and generally polices casino
gambling activities. Id. § 5:12-76. See generally Rose, supra note 5. at 27840; The
Casino Act, supra note 6, at 293-305.
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In enacting extensive regulatory schemes designed to keep persons
who may engage in corrupt or criminal activities out of the casino
industry,13 Nevada and New Jersey have created restrictions that
violate the Constitution and conflict with federal legislation. Part I of
this Note demonstrates that constitutional rights do attach to persons
engaged in legalized casino gambling, an activity that exists only as a
state-granted privilege. This Note contends that Nevada and New
Jersey, by establishing lists of excluded persons that prohibit certain
individuals from entering licensed casinos, have violated the constitu-
tional ban on bills of attainder. Part II analyzes statutes in both
Nevada and New Jersey that establish qualifications for union officers
in the casino industry in excess of those qualifications enacted in
federal legislation. This Note suggests that these statutes should be
preempted by federal labor law.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND STATE GAMBLING REGULATIONS
A. The Application of Constitutional Rights to Privileged Activities
Legalized gambling is a privileged activity. 4 As businesses that
can have harmful effects on the health, safety, and welfare of society,
privileged activities may be subject to greater state control than
businesses that are benign or useful." In permitting a privileged
activity, states have the power to establish extensive conditions re-
garding the form it may take 16 and the persons who may
13. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.130(1)(b) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-1(b)(9) (West
Supp. 1980-1981); see The Casino Act, supra note 6, at 292. It has been noted that
Nevada "has gone to great lengths to protect its peculiar institution . . . mindful that
he who stirs the devil's broth must . . . use a long spoon. For the whole of the
State's system of licensing gambling establishments shows its preoccupation with the
fear that the wrong kind of people may get control of these enterprises." Marshall v.
Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 648 (9th Cir. 1962) (Pope, J., concurring).
14. State v. Rosenthal, 93 Nev. 36, 40, 559 P.2d 830, 833, appeal dismissed, 434
U.S. 803 (1977); Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 67 Nev. 173, 187, 216 P.2d 985, 991
(1950); State ex rel. Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nev. 364, 372-73, 1 P.2d 570,
572 (1931); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.130(2) (1979).
15. State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 46, 22 A. 675, 676 (1891) (drugs), affd, 159 U.S.
74 (1895); State ex rel. Howie v. Common Council, 94 Minn. 81, 84, 101 N.W. 1063,
1064 (1904) (liquor); In re Jugenheimer, 81 Neb. 836, 839-40, 116 N.W. 966, 968
(1908) (liquor); Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 119, 310 P.2d 852, 854
(1957) (gambling); Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 12-13, 252 P.2d 835, 837-38
(1953) (gambling); Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 67 Nev. 173, 184-85, 216 P.2d 985,
991 (1950) (gambling); State ex rel. Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nev. 364, 372-
73, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (1931) (gambling).
16. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 94 (1890) (liquor); Premier-Pabst Sales
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 13 F. Supp. 90, 93, 96 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (liquor);
State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery, 177 Ala. 212, 237-38, 59 So. 294, 301 (1912)
(liquor); State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 45, 22 A. 675, 676 (1891) (drugs), affd, 159
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participate." The Nevada Supreme Court, in State v. Rosenthal,'5
however, has gone so far as to hold that gambling is "a matter re-
served to the states within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment
... [and that] [w]ithin this context [there is] no room for federally
protected constitutional rights." "9 This declaration overstates the au-
thority of the states in regulating privileged activities.'
The extensive police power of a state in regulating privileged activ-
ities does not indicate the absence of constitutional protections. Some
level of constitutional rights must be maintained.21 For example,
states may adopt extensive licensing procedures when regulating a
privileged activity.' Although these licensing procedures may utilize
U.S. 74 (1895); Parkes v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 236 Mich. 460, 465-66, 210
N.W. 492, 494 (1926) (gambling); State ex rel. Howie v. Common Council, 94 Minn.
81, 84, 101 N.W. 1063, 1064 (1904) (liquor); City of St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo.
588, 594, 31 S.W. 101, 102-03 (1895) (pawnbrokers); In re Jugenheimer. 81 Neb.
836, 841, 116 N.W. 966, 968 (1908) (liquor); Gragson v. Toco, 90 Nev. 131, 133, 520
P.2d 616, 617 (1974) (per curiam) (liquor); Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 12-13,
252 P.2d 835, 837-38 (1953) (gambling); Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 67 Nev. 173,
187, 216 P.2d 985, 992 (1950) (horse racing); State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20
Nev. 75, 80, 15 P. 783, 785 (1887) (gambling); Perry v. City Council, 7 Utah 143,
150, 25 P. 739, 740 (1891) (liquor).
17. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (pool and billiard
halls); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 94 (1890) (liquor); Marshall v. Sawyer,
365 F.2d 105, 111 (9th Cir. 1966) (gambling), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967);
State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery, 177 Ala. 212, 237-38, 59 So. 294, 301-02
(1912) (liquor); State ex rel. Howie v. Common Council, 94 Minn. 81, 85-86, 101
N.W. 1063, 1064 (1904) (liquor); City of St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 594, 31
S.W. 101, 102-03 (1895) (pawnbrokers); In re Jugenheimer, 81 Neb. 836, 841-42, 116
N.W. 966, 968 (1908) (liquor); Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 119, 310
P.2d 852, 854 (1957) (gambling); Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 12-13, 252 P.2d
835, 837-38 (1953) (gambling); State ex rel. Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nev.
364, 374, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (1931) (gambling); Perry v. City Council, 7 Utah 143,
150-52, 25 P. 739, 741-42 (1891) (liquor).
18. 93 Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
19. Id. at 44, 559 P.2d at 836 (footnote omitted). The tenth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "[the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
20. Gambling in America, supra note 2, at 84 ("Due process, for example, is
required in gaming control as much as in other areas of governmental acton.").
21. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (held that procedural
due process requirements applied despite the broad power of a state to regulate
matters relating to liquor); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949) ("[S]tates have power to legislate against what are
found to be injurious practices . . .so long as their laws do not run afoul of some
specific federal constitutional prohibition .... ).
22. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890) (liquor); State v. Cray, 61
Conn. 39, 46, 22 A. 675, 676 (1891) (drugs), aff'd 159 U.S. 74 (1895); State ex rel.
Howie v. Common Council, 94 Minn. 81, 83-84, 101 NA. 1063, 1064 (1904)
(liquor); Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 119, 310 P.2d 852, 855 (1957)
(gambling); Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 10, 252 P.2d 835, 838 (1953) (gamb-




criteria that would be held overly broad or vague if applied to
ordinary businesses,23 standards sufficient to meet the minimum re-
quirements of due process must be present.2 4  Similarly, although
substantial discretion may enter into licensing decisions, a state's ac-
tion cannot be so arbitrary and capricious as to ignore the safeguards
of due process and equal protection.23
B. The Unconstitutionality of the Nevada and New Jersey Lists of
Excluded Persons
Nevada and New Jersey maintain lists of persons barred from en-
tering any premises licensed for casino gambling.2' These lists of ex-
cluded persons represent an attempt by the states to protect legalized
casino gambling from infiltration by corrupt influences. 27 In main-
taining these lists, however, Nevada and New Jersey have exceeded
the limits of their police power because such restrictions contravene
the constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder.28
A bill of attainder is a legislative act that lists named persons or an
identifiable group for the purpose of punishing such persons or group
without a judicial trial. 29  Clearly, a list of excluded persons consti-
tutes a legislative act directed at named persons. In Nevada, for ex-
23. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186-88 (1900); State ex rel. Crumpton v.
Montgomery, 177 Ala. 212, 238, 59 So. 294 302 (1912); Perry v. City Council, 7
Utah 143, 152, 25 P. 739, 741 (1891).
24. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186-88 (1900); Crowley v. Christcnson,
137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890); In re Jugenheimer, 81 Neb. 836, 843, 116 N.W. 966, 969
(1908); Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 121, 310 P.2d 852, 855 (1957);
State ex rel. Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nev. 364, 366, 1 P.2d 570, 573 (1931).
25. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186-88 (1900); Crowley v. Christenscn,
137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890); State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 46, 22 A. 675, 676 (1891); State
ex rel. Howie v. Common Council, 94 Minn. 81, 84, 101 N.W. 1063, 1064 (1904); In
re Jugenheimer, 81 Neb. 836, 843, 116 N.W. 966, 969 (1908); Nevada Tax Comm'n
v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 118, 310 P.2d 852, 855 (1957); Primm v. City of Reno, 70
Nev. 7, 10, 252 P.2d 835, 838 (1953); Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 67 Nev. 173,
182, 216 P.2d 985, 990 (1950); State ex rel. Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nov.
364, 366, 1 P.2d 570, 573 (1931).
26. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71 (West Supp.
1980-1981).
27. Development of the Law of Gambling, supra note 1, at 451; J. Skolnick,
supra note 9, at 121.
28. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 provides, in part, that "[n]o Bill of Attainder
... shall be passed." Although constitutional rights may not exist in full force when
applied to privileged activities, see notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text, the
constitutional clause regarding bills of attainder creates an absolute prohibition, and
therefore does not allow for a lesser standard. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
29. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); United




ample, the Nevada Gaming Control Act"' authorizes the Nevada
Gaming Commission to maintain "a list of persons who are to be
excluded or ejected from any establishment which is licensed to oper-
ate any gambling game.""1 Persons who may be excluded from
licensed premises include those who are "of notorious or unsavory
reputation," have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude or a violation of the Nevada Casino Control Act," or "[w]hose
presence in a licensed gaming establishment would, in the opinion of
the board and commission, be inimical to the interests of the State of
Nevada, or of licensed gambling, or both."14 Similarly, New Jersey
authorizes its Casino Control Commission to establish an excluded
persons list, utilizing essentially the same standards.Y
The pivotal issue in determining whether a legislative act is a bill
of attainder is whether the persons identified are subjected to
punishment." Punishment can take the form of a criminal sanction
or a deprivation of a civil right.3' Mere withdrawal of a previously
enjoyed right, however, is not sufficient.'a Punitive intent must be
present."
The Supreme Court has inferred punitive intent in various ways.
These include whether the action taken by the legislature fits a tradi-
tional form of punishment,'0 whether the purpose of the legislative
action is to fulfill a traditional goal of punishment," or whether the
effect of the legislation is punitive." The form, purpose, and effect of
30. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.010-.720 (1979).
31. Id. § 463.151(1).
32. Id. § 463.151(1)(a).
33. Id. § 463.151(1)(b).
34. Id. § 463.151(1)(c).
35. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(a)(i)-(3) (West Supp. 1980-1981). New Jersey re-
quires the exclusion of persons "[w]ho are career or professional offenders ....
[w]ho have been convicted of a criminal offense ... punishable by more than 6
months in prison, or . . . involving moral turpitude [or,] [wlhose presence in a
licensed casino would . . . be inimical to the interests of the State . .. or of licensed
gaming therein." Id.
36. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472-73 (1977); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 468-69 (1965) (White, J., dissenting); American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
37. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320-22 (1867).
38. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471-72 (1977).
39. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478-79 (1977); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320-22 (1867).
40. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
41. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 476 n.40 (1977); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
42. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977); United




the Nevada and New Jersey lists of excluded persons indicate puni-
tive intent.
The restrictions imposed upon an individual whose name appears
on a list of excluded persons are similar in form to deprivations that
have constituted punishment. Both Nevada and New Jersey com-
pletely exclude listed persons from any part of a premises licensed for
gambling and from associating with any licensee.' This proscription
is enforced primarily through the threat of various sanctions,44 includ-
ing revocation of a casino license,45 against any licensee who does not
exclude or eject a listed person.46 In this respect, a listed person is
denied the enjoyment of a privilege available to all but certain legisla-
tively chosen persons. Such a deprivation is analogous to statutes,
held to be bills of attainder, that deny persons the privilege of gov-
ernment employment.17  Additionally, exclusion from casinos is simi-
lar to statutes, held to be punitive, that banished certain persons or
groups from a community or the country.48 Most significantly, a
listed person who enters a licensed facility may be criminally prose-
43. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151, .154 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71 (West Supp.
1980-1981). A former governor of Nevada endorsed the list of excluded persons, stat-
ing that " 'I agree with any measures necessary to keep the hoodlums out of
Nevada.... We might as well serve notice on underworld characters right now that
they are not welcome in Nevada and we aren't going to have them here.' " Marshall
v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1962) (quoting Gov. Sawyer).
44. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.154 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(c) (West Supp.
1980-1981). The Nevada statute authorizes the commission to revoke, limit, condi-
tion, or suspend a casino's license or to fine a licensee who fails to exclude or eject a
listed person. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.154 (1979). The New Jersey statute does not
provide specific sanctions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(c) (West Supp. 1980-1981). New
Jersey's Casino Control Commission, however, may impose essentially the same
sanctions as those enumerated in the Nevada statute for any violation of the statute
or the Commission's regulations. Id. § 5:12-64.
45. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.154 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-64, -71(c) (West
Supp. 1980-1981).
46. In Nevada, the list of excluded persons was originally issued by the State
Gaming Control Board pursuant to a Nevada Gaming Commission regulation. Mar-
shall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967). The Board issued, in addition to the list, several suggestions on how a licen-
see could enforce this regulation. Id. at 108 n.2. It advised hotels to tell listed per-
sons who sought accomodations that no rooms were available, and that any listed
person who somehow obtained a room be requested to leave and be given poor
service or none at all. Id. The Board conducted raids and harrassing inspections
when it discovered that casinos had accomodated a listed person. Id. at 108 n.3.
47. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867). The Court has upheld statutes depriving an individual
of employment in a state-licensed occupation, but only when the criteria in the stat-
ute bore a reasonable relationship to professional qualifications. Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1898).
48. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23 (1963); Cooper v.
Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 17 (1800).
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cuted, fined, and imprisoned." The imposition of this sanction
would undeniably be punitive.'
The Nevada and New Jersey statutes serve the punitive purpose of
restraint. Punishment by restraint is designed so that "society may
protect itself from persons deemed dangerous because of their past
... conduct by isolating these persons from society." ' Under the
Nevada and New Jersey statutes, a determination is made, based on
past conduct and reputation, that the presence of certain persons in
casinos may lead to corrupt influences in gambling activities.' These
persons are then restrained from that conduct by being included on
the list of excluded persons and thus barred from any contact wvith
gambling activities.'
The Nevada and New Jersey statutes clearly have a punitive effect.
The standards in both states for determining who will be added to
the lists of excluded persons address past conduct.4 Generally, if a
person can avoid a statute's consequences through his present or fu-
ture conduct, the statute is deemed nonpunitive.' When past con-
49. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.155 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-118 (West Supp.
1980-1981). The Nevada statute makes entry into licensed premises by a listed per-
son a gross misdemeanor. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.155 (1979). In Nevada, a gross
misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for no more than one year or a fine of
no more than $1000. Id. § 193.140. Under the New Jersey statute, a listed person
who enters a licensed premises has committed a misdemeanor. N.J. Stat. Ann. §
5:12-118 (West Supp. 1980-1981). A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment of
no more than three years and a fine of no more than $1000. Id. § 2A:85-7 (West
1969).
50. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 474 (1977); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
51. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 22 (1972) (footnote
omitted); see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
52. J. Skolnick, supra note 9, at 121-22; see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151 (1979);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
53. Marshall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 107-08 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967); see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151(1) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(c)
(West Supp. 1980-1981). Individuals on the list of excluded persons are prevented
from entering any part of a licensed premises, not just the gambling areas. Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 463.151(1) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(c) (West Supp. 1980-1981); see J.
Skolnick, supra note 9, at 121-22.
54. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151(1)(b) (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(a)(1), (2)
(West Supp. 1980-1981).
55. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 88 (1961); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
413-14 (1950); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867). In American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute denying
access to the National Labor Relations Board to any person who did not file an
affadavit stating that he was not affiliated with the Communist Party. Id. at 415. The
Court emphasized that this statute was directed at future, not past, conduct and thus
was not punishment. Id. at 413-14. The statute imposed no restrictions, the Court
reasoned, if a person merely changed his present conduct by renouncing Communist
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duct alone subjects a person to the statute's operation, however, and
his future actions will not alter the statute's effect,m punitive intent
can be inferred.,
The primary purpose of barring legislatures from enacting bills of
attainder is to assure that a person will not be adjudged guilty and
subjected to punishment without the benefit of the procedural safe-
guards required in a judicial trial. The Nevada Gaming Commis-
sion and New Jersey's Casino Control Commission may place anyone
within the states' statutory definitions on their excluded persons
lists. 9 The procedures followed by these administrative agencies do
not comply with the protections traditionally afforded in a judicial
trial. 60 In both states, an individual is placed on the list of excluded
persons without a public hearing.6 Neither a jury nor an impartial
Party membership. Id. In contrast, the statute invalidated in United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), disqualified all persons who had been members of the
Communist Party from holding union office. Id. at 438-39. No present action by an
individual could enable him to avoid the statute's proscriptions. Id. at 452. "The
moment [the statute] was enacted, respondent was given the choice of declining a
leadership position in his union or incurring criminal liability." Id.
56. One commentator has labeled persons who are subjected to such a statute as
members of an "inescapable class." Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specfca-
tion: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L.J. 330, 339
(1962).
57. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1961); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
414 (1950); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946); Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867).
58. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46, 461 (1965); Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 146-47 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-18 (1946); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867).
59. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71 (West Supp.
1980-1981).
60. "An accused in court must be tried by an impartial jury, has a right to be
represented by counsel, he must be clearly informed of the charge against him....
he must be confronted by the witnesses against him, [and] he must not be compelled
to incriminate himself ...... United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946). In
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S.
1 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a finding by an administrative agency that the
Communist Party was controlled by the Soviet Union and would be required to
register under an act of Congress was not a bill of attainder. Id. at 86. The Court
noted that this administrative hearing was extensive, containing substantial proce-
dural safeguards. Id. at 86-87. The holding was further justified because the act ad-
dressed present and future conduct, and thus was not punitive. Id.; see notes 55-57
supra. In his dissent, Justice Black warned against "administrative fact-findings of an
agency which is not a court, .. . and which does not have to observe the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury and other trial safeguards." Id. at 146 (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
61. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151 (1979) (authorizing the Nevada Gaming Com-
mission to place names on the list of excluded persons); id. § 463.153 (providing for
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judge evaluates the evidenceY Instead, the determination to include
a person on the list is within the sole discretion of the state agency.14
The individual is not told of the charges and he cannot confront the
witnesses or evidence against him.6 Although a person may demand
a hearing subsequent to his inclusion,6 he will be required to "show
cause why he should have his name taken from such a list."' 6 The
effect is to shift the burden of proof to the listed person,6-" denying
him the presumption of innocence. 61
Even if the hearing following a person's inclusion on the list pro-
vided the essential procedural safeguards, the punishment has already
been imposed. A person subsequently removed from the list has
nevertheless suffered from its restrictions.' Furthermore, a listed
person who enters a casino is subject to criminal sanctions despite his
later removal from the list."0
Although an individual on the list of excluded persons may request
judicial review of the state agency's decision, the procedural safe-
guards inherent in a judicial trial are not available to him. When a
statute provides for a discretionary determination by a state agency in
a privileged area, a court will merely defer to that agency's expertise
hearing only after the Nevada Gaming Commission has acted). N.J. Stat. Ann. §
5:12-71(a) (West Supp. 1980-1981) (authorizing the Casino Control Commission to
place names on the list of excluded persons); id. § 5:12-71(0 (providing for hearing
only after the Commission has acted).
62. A danger inherent in bills of attainder is the absence of an impartial jury.
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
63. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.151 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(a) (West Supp.
1980-1981).
64. See note 61 supra. Procedural safeguards denied a party who is the target of
a bill of attainder include the rights to be informed of the charges against him and to
confront witnesses. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
65. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.153 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(f-(i) (West Supp.
1980-1981).
66. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.153(1) (1979); accord, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(A (West
Supp. 1980-1981).
67. Before punishment can be imposed in a criminal case, the prosecution must
meet the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion. W. LaFave &
A. Scott, supra note 51, at 44-45.
68. The presumption of innocence, a standard jury instruction, is protected in a
criminal case by placing the burden of proof on the prosecution. Id. at 52.
69. Because the statutes in both Nevada and New Jersey require that licensed
casinos eject any individual on the list of excluded persons, Nev. Rev. Stat. §
463.151 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-71(c) (West Supp. 1980-1981), a listed indi-
vidual is unable to enter a licensed premises while his name is on the list. See
Marshall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 108 (1966), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
70. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.155 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-118 (West Supp.
1980-1981).




unless its decision is shown to be arbitrary and capricious.72 For in-
stance, although the Ninth Circuit criticized the lack of due process
in Nevada Gaming Control Board proceedings, 71 it upheld the agen-
cy's determinations.74 Furthermore, a listed person remains subject
to sanctions of the statute prior to the conclusion of judicial review."
The framers of the Constitution prohibited bills of attainder pri-
marily to prevent legislatures from usurping judicial power.76 They
feared that legislatures would enact punitive statutes directed at par-
ticular persons or groups, thereby circumventing the constitutional
guarantees of due process inherent in the judicial process.77 No
state's interest in a corruption-free gambling industry can support the
invasion of a constitutional right.
II. FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND STATE GAMBLING REGULATIONS
Constitutional guarantees are not the only restrictions on state reg-
ulation of gambling. Federal legislation that is otherwise a valid exer-
cise of congressional powers may impinge upon state policies7 and
laws. Therefore, the state police power to act with regard to gamb-
ling activities must yield to federal legislation.1°
72. E.g., Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 121, 310 P.2d 852, 855
(1957); Primm v. City of Reno, 70 Nev. 7, 10, 252 P.2d 835, 838 (1953); Dunn v.
Nevada Tax Comm'n, 67 Nev. 173, 182-83, 216 P.2d 985, 990 (1950); State ex rel.
Grimes v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 Nev. 364, 375, 1 P.2d 570, 573 (1931).
73. Marshall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 112 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967).
74. Id. The plaintiff had conceded the correctness of the Nevada Gaming Control
Board's determinations. Id. The court refused to find a violation of his right to due
process because of this "technicality." Id.
75. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
76. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46, 461 (1965); Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 146-47 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-18 (1946); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867).
77. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-5, at 491-92 (1978).
78. Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968).
79. E.g., Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (uphold-
ing federal statute regarding the flow of liquor in interstate commerce); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding federal statute prohibiting the use of
interstate travel for purposes of illicit sexual activity); Champion v. Ames (The Lot-
tery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding federal statute prohibiting the interstate
shipment of lottery tickets).
80. United States v. Nichols, 421 F.2d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 1970); Martin v. United
States, 389 F.2d 895, 896 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States
v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Mar-
shall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999, 1004 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815
(1966); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577. 579 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 915 (1965); United States v. Corallo, 281 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
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A. The Conflict Between Federal Labor Law and State Gambling
Regulations
Section 504(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA) disqualifies persons convicted of certain felonies from
holding union office for five years following conviction or completion
of the imposed sentence.' Both Nevada's and New Jersey's regula-
tions of casino gambling include extensive restrictions on who may
hold union officeY These statutes exceed the limits of section 504(a)
in many respects.
United States v. Kelley, 254 F. Supp. 9, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part. ree'd in
part on other grounds, 395 F.2d 727 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 963 (1968).
United States v. Ryan, 213 F. Supp. 763, 765-66 (D. Colo. 1963); United States v.
Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 915 (E.D. Ill. 1962); United States v. 5 Gambling Devices,
119 F. Supp. 641, 644 (N.D. Ga. 1952), affd, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v.
65 Slot Machines, 102 F. Supp. 922, 924 (W.D. La. 1952). See generally Develop-
ment of the Law of Gambling, supra note 1, at 557-607. Nevada officials have main-
tained that gambling is entirely within the state domain and cannot be subjected to
federal regulation. 96 Cong. Rec. 13646 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Baring); J. Skolnick.
supra note 9, at 230. Congress, however, has regulated the interstate aspects of
gambling several times, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1976) (barring interstate shipment
of gambling devices); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1083 (1976) (barring gambling on certain
ships); id. § 1084 (barring transmission of wagering information over interstate wvire
service); id. §§ 1301-1304 (regulating lotteries); id. § 1952 (barring interstate travel
for racketeering purposes); id. § 1953 (barring interstate shipment of gambling para-
phernalia), and these statutes have been consistently upheld. E.g., United States v.
Nichols, 421 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1970); Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966); United States v. Corallo, 281 F. Supp. 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Nevada's casino gambling industry is so extensively involved in
interstate activities that some authorities fear that the federal government could
effectively end legalized casino gambling. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 649 (9th
Cir. 1962) (Pope, J., concurring); J. Skolnick, supra note 9, at 124-27; see 96 Cong.
Rec. 13646 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Baring). In deference to the importance of gamb-
ling to the Nevada economy, Congress enacted a provision in the statute barring
interstate shipment of gambling devices, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1976), permitting
the shipment of those devices into states that specifically exempt themselves from
the statute's coverage, id. § 1172. Development of the Law of Gambling, supra note
1, at 566. Both Nevada and New Jersey have exercised this option. Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 463.410, .420 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-131, -132 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976). Pursuant to section 504(a), a person holding union
office is any officer, director, trustee, executive board member, business agent, labor
organizer, or nonclerical or noncustodial employee of any labor organization and its
affiliates. Id.
82. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463A.040 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-93(b) (West Supp.
1980-1981). The Nevada statute allows the Nevada Gaming Commission to disqualify
from holding union office any person who falls within the statutory standards. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 463A.040 (1979). The New Jersey statute prohibits any union that has a
disqualified person as an officer from collecting dues. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-93(b)
(West Supp. 1980-1981). It has been noted that a statute similar to the New Jersey
statute is in effect a restriction on who may hold union office. De Veau v. Braisted,
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Both state statutes preclude persons convicted of crimes not in-
cluded in section 504(a) from holding union office.' By including
crimes not enumerated in section 504(a), these statutes, in effect,
adopt criteria that were rejected by Congress.& Furthermore, the
Nevada statute disqualifies persons convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude or a lack of business honesty.-u The New Jersey stat-
ute precludes persons convicted of "any . . . offense which indicates
that [permitting this person to hold union office] would be inimical to
the policy of this act and to casino operations." 86 Proposals were
made in Congress to disqualify from union office any person who had
been convicted of a crime involving "moral turpitude." 87  These
proposals were rejected because of the concern that such a general
standard would impose too great a restriction.'
363 U.S. 144, 152 (1960) (statute disables employees from choosing their bargaining
representatives). In Nevada, a person holding union office is anyone who adjusts
grievances, negotiates wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, solic-
its or receives dues or other charges, or acts as officer or business agent in a super-
visory or policy-making position for labor organizations in the casino industry. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 463A.030 (1979). In New Jersey, a person holding union office is any
officer, agent, or principal employee of labor organizations in the casino industry.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-93(b) (West Supp. 1980-1981). An officer is a person who
fulfills the functions of a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, or similar
executive positions. N.J. Admin. Code § 19:41-12.1 (1979). An agent is any person
who represents the union in any employment matters. Id. A principal employee is
any person who "exercises any authority, discretion or influence with regard to any
matter relating to employees." Id.
83. Section 504(a) precludes from holding union office any person "who has been
convicted of ... robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, bur-
glary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill,
assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or a violation of [the LMRDA] . . . for
five years after such conviction or after the end of ... imprisonment." 29 U.S.C.
504(a) (1976). Nevada allows for disqualification of a person who has been convicted
of any crime, whether denominated a felony or a misdemeanor, involving moral tur-
pitude or indicating a lack of business honesty or integrity. Nev. Rev. Stat. §
463A.040 (1979). New Jersey disqualifies all persons who would be precluded from
obtaining a casino license. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-93(b) (West Supp. 1980-1981). Per-
sons convicted of certain enumerated offenses are also disqualified. Id. § 5:12-86(c).
These offenses include all crimes of the first degree, murder, manslaughter, aggra-
vated assault, assault and battery, arson, causing or risking widespread injury or
damage, robbery, burglary, larceny, receipt of stolen property, forgery, fraud, brib-
ery, corrupt influence, perjury, misconduct in office, obstructing the execution of
process, embezzlement, extortion, several narcotics offenses, several gambling
offenses, incest, kidnapping, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and any of several high misde-
meanors. Id.
84. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6554-55 (1959) (remarks of Sens. Kennedy, McClellan
and Mundt); id. at 6580 (chart showing various proposed versions of § 504(a)).
85. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463A.040 (1979).
86. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-86(c)(4) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
87. 105 Cong. Rec. 6554 (1959) (remarks of Sens. Kennedy and McClellan).
88. Id. (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("I ask unanimous consent that I may modify
the amendment by striking out the words 'moral turpitude.' . . . [Tihe purpose [of §
1050 [Vol. 49
CASINO GAMBLING
Both state statutes provide for disqualification from union office for
reasons other than conviction of a crime. Nevada authorizes the Gam-
ing Commission to disqualify a person who has made false or mislead-
ing statements to the Commission," who is identified as associated
with organized crime,' or whose "moral character and integrity ...
are such as to create a reasonable belief that his performance ...
would not be consistent with the policy of [the] state.""' New Jersey
bars from union office any person who would be prohibited from
obtaining a casino license.9" Criteria for denying such licenses in-
clude pending indictments, current prosecution," or the commission,
regardless of conviction,9" of any of the statutorily enumerated
offenses.' An individual can also be disqualified for failing to provide
proof of his qualifications,96 for receiving money under suspect
circumstances, 97 for being identified as a career offender or as the
associate of a career offender, or for failing to cooperate in any hear-
ing regarding organized crime, gambling, or official corruption." Con-
gress' purpose in enacting section 504(a) was to disqualify only "habi-
tual criminals" from holding union office."°  Disqualification criteria
in both statutes that are unrelated to actual criminal convictions fail
to meet this purpose. These criteria, therefore, exceed the restric-
tions intended by Congress.
The statutes in both Nevada and New Jersey provide for a period
of ineligibility from union office longer than that enacted by Con-
gress. Nevada establishes no limit on the length of ineligibility for
any of its disqualification criteria.'' New Jersey mandates disqual-
ification for ten years following conviction "o and sets no time limit for
disqualification on other grounds. " Section 504(a), however, disqual-
ifies a person for only five years following conviction or the com-
pletion of the sentence imposed."°' Congress did consider various
504(a)] is to have the amendment apply to those who have shown definite criminal
tendencies.").
89. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463A.040(2) (1979).
90. Id. § 463A.040(3).
91. Id. § 463A.040(4).
92. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-93(b) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
93. Id. § 5:12-86(d).
94. Id. § 5:12-86(g).
95. Id. § 5:12-86(c).
96. Id. § 5:12-86(b).
97. Id. § 5:12-86(e).
98. Id. § 5:12-86().
99. Id. § 5:12-86(h).
100. 105 Cong. Rec. 6555 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
101. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463A.040 (1979).
102. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-86(c)(4) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
103. Id. § 5:12-86.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976).
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proposals for longer ineligibility periods,10 but rejected them because
of the concern that a longer period would unfairly deprive a rehabili-
tated person of the privilege of holding union office.',"
B. Federal Labor Law Preemption of State Gambling Regulations
To the extent that the Nevada and New Jersey statutes limit em-
ployees' choice of a representative beyond the restrictions imposed
by Congress, these statutes should be preempted. Although there is
no general formula to determine whether a federal statute preempts
state law,"°7 when a state law actually conflicts with a federal statute,
it clearly is preempted.' °1 Additionally, a state law will be invali-
dated even though no direct conflict is present if it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." "
In the field of labor relations, Congress has enacted extensive
legislation 110 establishing a clear national policy."' Congress, in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),"2 declared certain rights of em-
ployees to be federally protected."3  Specifically, the NLRA imposes
no federal restrictions on the selection of bargaining representatives.
Section 1 of the NLRA declares it federal policy to protect em-
ployees' "full freedom of . . . designation of representatives of their
own choosing," 114 and section 7 establishes this policy as an affirma-
tive right. I'
105. 105 Cong. Rec. 6555 (1959) (remarks of Sens. McClellan and Mundt).
106. Id. at 6555 (remarks of Sen. Mundt) ("We all know of some persons who
have been incarcerated and have made an honest reformation. Having done so, they
should be given their full rights and privileges to serve as union officers.").
107. L. Tribe, supra note 77, § 6-23, at 377.
108. Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,
138-39 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14243
(1963); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913); Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
109. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); accord, Florida Lime & Avoca-
do Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959); Hill v. Florida ex rel, Watson, 325 U.S. 538,
542 (1945).
110. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976); Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-188 (1976); Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1976).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) ("It is declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce . . . by encouraging the practice . . . of collective bargaining .....
112. Id. §§ 151-169.
113. Id. § 157.
114. Id. § 151.
115. Id. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... ).
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In Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson,"' the Supreme Court addressed
whether sections 1 and 7 preempted state legislation that disqualified
certain persons from union office." 7 Florida had enacted a statute
that barred persons who had been a United States citizen for less
than ten years, had been convicted of a felony, or were not of good
moral character from acting as a union bargaining representative."'
Holding that the Florida statute was preempted by section 7,119 the
Court stated that " '[fjull freedom' to choose an agent means freedom
to pass upon that agent's qualifications. . . . To the extent that [a
state statute] limits a union's choice of such . . . bargaining repre-
sentative, it substitutes [the state's] judgment for the workers'
judgment." 2 The purpose of section 7, the Court reasoned, was to
assure employees the ability to freely choose their bargaining
representatives, 2' and that neither the employer nor the state could
impose any restrictions on that choice."2
The Supreme Court, in De Veau v. Braisted, again considered
the extent to which a state could regulate the qualifications of a union
official. In an effort to regulate corrupt employment practices at the
Port of New York, New York and New Jersey jointly enacted the
Waterfront Commission Compact.2' As an agreement between two
states, the compact required congressional approval."2 New York
enacted supplementary legislation to the compact,'2 the Waterfront
Commission Act," barring the collection of dues by labor organiza-
tions in waterfront industries that had as officers persons who had
been convicted of a felony."' The De Veau Court upheld the New
York statute."9  Writing for the plurality, Justice Frankfurter repeat-
edly emphasized the significance of the congressional approval of the
Waterfront Commission Compact.' He noted that this approval fol-
lowed congressional investigation and debate. 3' The compact ex-
116. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
117. Id. at 539.
118. Id. at 540.
119. Id. at 542.
120. Id. at 541.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 542.
123. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
124. Pub. L. No. 83-252, 67 Stat. 541 (1953).
125. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 provides, in part, that "'[n]o State shall, without
the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State."
126. 363 U.S. at 150-51.
127. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws (65) §§ 9931-9937 (McKinney 1974).
128. Id. § 9933.
129. 363 U.S. at 151.
130. Id. at 149-50, 151, 153, 154, 155.
131. Id. at 150-51.
1981] 1053
1054 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
pressly authorized supplementary legislation by each state,"' and
Congress was aware of proposals in both states restricting the qual-
ifications of union officials prior to its approval."3 Under these cir-
cumstances, Justice Frankfurter concluded that Congress could not
have intended the New York Waterfront Crime Act to have been
preempted by section 7 of the NLRA." He distinguished Hill, not-
ing that "[ain element most persuasive here, congressional approval
of the heart of the state legislative program explicitly brought to its
attention, was not present in that case."',
The De Veau Court also considered whether the New York statute
was preempted by section 504(a) of the LMRDA, enacted several
years after the Hill decision." The plurality held that section 504(a)
did not preempt New York's Waterfront Commission Act.'37 Justice
Frankfurter relied primarily upon two sections of the LMRDA that
expressly preempted state law' 1 to reason that Congress did not in-
tend preemption when it did not provide for it. 39  This rationale
ignores numerous cases holding that federal labor law preempts state
law despite the absence of an express statement of preemption. "'
Additionally, both sections discussed by Justice Frankfurter deal with
areas not previously regulated by Congress.' These provisions can
be distinguished fiom section 504(a) because the latter section, reg-
ulating qualifications for union office, dealt with an area that had
132. Pub. L. No. 83-252, 67 Stat. 541, 541 (1953) ("[C]onsent of Congress Is
hereby given to.the compact set forth .. and to the carrying out and effectuation of
said compact ....").
133. 363 U.S. at 151.
134. Id. at 154-55.
135. Id. at 155.
136. Hill was decided in 1945. Hill v. Florida ex rel, Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 538
(1945). The LMRDA was enacted in 1959. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)).
137. 363 U.S. at 156-57.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 435(c) (1976) (federal duty imposed on union to make certain
reports preempts state law); id. § 483 (federally mandated election procedures for
union officials preempts state law).
139. 363 U.S. at 156-57.
140. E.g., Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325
U.S. 538 (1945). In discussing another proposed section of the LMRDA relating to
the establishment of a federal fiduciary relationship between a union officer and
members, 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1976), several Congressmen noted that state law would
be preempted unless Congress expressly provided otherwise. 105 Cong. Rec. 6482-
83 (1959) (remarks of Sens. Clark, Curtis, Holland, Kennedy, Kuchel and McClel-
lan). As Senator Kennedy stated, "I would think that in order to prevent [an] amend-
ment from preempting the field, certainly additional language would be required."
Id. at 6482 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
141. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, 25-27, reprinted in [1959]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2318-21, 2336-38.
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been previously regulated by Congress 1 and held preemptive."' Jus-
tice Frankfurter also justified the De Veau holding by analogizing sec-
tion 504(a) to another section of the LMRDA that expressly states
that "the authority of any State to enact and enforce general criminal
laws" '" is not impaired.'4' The legislative history of this section,
however, indicates that Congress was considering only state criminal
laws and did not intend this section to apply to any other provision of
the LMRDA.'" The restrictions of section 504(a) are undeniably not
criminal. " Furthermore, because the De Veau holding that section
504(a) is not preemptive of state law does not rely on the unique
situation of a congressionally-approved compact, it is inconsistent
with the express purpose of the LMRDA in general, section 504(a) in
particular, and labor preemption precedent.
The LMRDA was enacted in response to revelations of corruption
in labor organizations." Its purpose was to protect employees' rights
of union democracy."' It was enacted not to restrict any of the ex-
isting rights of employees in free collective bargaining,"' but to
assure the effective exercise of these rights.5M Congress, in the
LMRDA, reaffirmed the policy of the NLRA that federal law domi-
nate the labor relations field.,5 In its declaration of purpose, the
statute provides that "it continues to be the responsibility of the
Federal Government to protect employees' rights to organize, choose
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1976); see notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text.
143. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); see notes 116-22 supra
and accompanying text.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 524 (1976).
145. 363 U.S. at 157.
146. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, reprinted in [19591 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2349-50; 105 Cong. Ree. 5984-85, 5989-91 (1959) (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 6485-86 (remarks of Sens. Kennedy, Lausche and McClel-
Ian).
147. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in [19591 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2366 ('This provision .. . is not conceived by the commit-
tee as additional punishment."). In De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), the
Court held that restrictions similar to those in section 504(a) were not punitive. Id. at
160 (" he proof is overwhelming that New York sought not to punish ex-felons, but
to devise . . .a much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront.").
148. 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1976); 105 Cong. Rec. 6108-09 (1959) (remarks of Sen.
Goldwater); id. at 6131 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 6228 (remarks of Sen. Allot);
id. at 6237 (remarks of Sen. Moss).
149. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5, 27, reprinted in [1959] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2318, 2323, 2336.
150. Id. at 6, 27, 70, reprinted in [1959] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2322,
2336, 2477; 105 Cong. Rec. 6485 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Morse).
151. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-27, 70. reprinted in [1959] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2336-38, 2477; 105 Cong. Rec. 6485 (1959) (remarks
of Sen. Morse).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976); see notes 110-15 supra and accompanying text.
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their own representatives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage
in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection." "
Although the LMRDA does allow limited state involvement,'," prim-
ary regulation of the labor field was reserved to the federal
government. ',
Specifically, the legislative history of section 504(a) indicates that
the establishment of any qualifications for union office is an
exclusively federal responsibility.'" Senator Kennedy stated that sec-
tion 504(a) was "designed to further protect union members' and the
public interest by establishing certain standards for persons holding
union office-a matter within the purview of the Federal
Government." 157 Additionally, the Senate committee that recom-
mended the LMRDA noted that the provisions in section 504(a) were
the maximum restrictions that should be imposed "in the interests of
justice." I
To hold that section 504(a) does not represent the limits that may
be placed on qualifications for union office not only ignores congres-
sional intent, it contradicts Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson.' 9 Accord-
ing to the Hill decision, secton 7 of the NLIIA guarantees employees
the unequivocal right to choose their bargaining representatives. 6
Section 504(a) limits that choice, but it does not alter the basic
right.' 61  State statutes that impose any restriction on that choice
greater than those in section 504(a) necessarily affect NLRA section 7
rights. Therefore, state statutes establishing restrictions on the qual-
ifications of union officials are necessarily preempted by both section
7 of the NLRA and section 504(a) of the LMRDA.
CONCLUSION
Casino gambling presents states with both the temptation of rev-
enue benefits and the risk of crime and corruption. When states
choose to legalize this activity, they may deal with the threat to pub-
153. 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976).
154. Id. § 164(c), as amended by Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541 (state jurisdiction not
preempted when NLRB refuses jurisdiction); id. § 523 (state fiduciary relationship
not preempted); id. § 524 (state general criminal laws not preempted).
155. Id. § 401(a).
156. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in [1959] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2366.
157. 105 Cong. Rec. 5989 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
158. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in [1959] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2366.
159. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
160. Id. at 541.
161. See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text
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lic health, safety, and welfare through an extensive regulatory
scheme. The power of states to regulate these activities, however, is
not unlimited. States may not enact regulations that impinge upon
constitutional rights. Similarly, states may not impose restrictions that
conflict with federal legislation.
Kathryn Keneally
